The Best of All Possible Worlds
(or Pretty Darn Close)
Reinier Kraakmant
Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock's Article, How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover
Law,' captures an intuition that has come to dominate the middle
ground between supporters and critics of Delaware's takeover jurisprudence. This is the view that management's discretion to defeat hostile takeovers under Delaware law just does not matter much today.
The reason is not that the current law is right-or wrong. Rather it is
because offsetting developments within the corporation-option
compensation and active boards-have made managers far more receptive to selling their companies today than they were during the
turbulent 1980s.
Kahan and Rock present a stylized history of the takeover market in three parts. First there was the big bang, an exogenous shock in
the early 1980s that sharply increased hostile takeovers. This wave of
hostile takeovers lasted only a few years, however. It soon was followed by a second period in which takeover activity-and hostile
takeovers in particular-fell precipitously. Although the economy was
largely responsible for this change, legal and corporate governance
developments also contributed to it. During the mid- and late 1980s,
state legislatures adopted antitakeover legislation, while management
and its allies experimented with defensive tactics. Management's efforts at self-help culminated in the poison pill, which the Delaware
Supreme Court blessed, at least provisionally, in 1986. The pill placed
management back in the catbird seat, able to block hostile takeovers
without seeking shareholder approval. But the system still was not in
equilibrium. There was no turning back the clock; shareholders still
wanted the takeover premia that accompanied a robust flow of deals.
Equilibrium returned to the system only in the third and final period,
beginning around 1992, when option compensation plans and independent boards of directors combined to spark a new wave of friendly
acquisitions that profited both shareholders and the managers of target companies.
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In the authors' view, this history teaches us that things work
themselves out. Evolving compensation and governance policies have
largely neutralized the board's power to block hostile takeovers. Today, target managers and shareholders collaborate for mutual benefit.
Pills and staggered boards are controversial only if we fail to realize
that they do not function in a vacuum. Legal change that empowers
corporate boards to resist takeovers is offset by "adaptive" change,
such as increases in option compensation, that encourage target
boards to put aside defenses and accept fairly-priced takeovers. What
matters is this entire ensemble of effects and countereffects, not its
isolated components.
I am persuaded by many-but not all-of the lessons that Kahan
and Rock draw from this history. First, they are undoubtedly right to
remind us that effects of law depend on the responses of the participants in a market such as the market for corporate control. It will not
do to address the effects of takeover law separate from compensation
policy and corporate governance (or to analyze doctrinal developments "ceteris paribus" rather than "mutatis mutandis," as the authors

put it).
Second, I suspect that the authors also are right in their conjecture that dramatic increases in option compensation have encouraged
target managers to part with their companies more easily in the 1990s
than in earlier decades. In fact, together with a colleague, John Coates,
I am currently investigating the relationship between option compensation and the probability that companies were acquired during the
1990s.' We expect to find more or less what Kahan and Rock would
predict: a positive relationship between management's decision to sell
a company and the size of its payout in the event of a sale (relative to
management's expected compensation if the company remains independent). Thus far, however, we have not been able to demonstrate
this relationship beyond cavil. The value of CEO options is clearly
correlated with the mean probability that an S&P 1500 firm was acquired between 1992 and 1995. 3 But the value of CEO options continued to accelerate from 1995 through 1998, while mean acquisition
probabilities remained roughly constant. Moreover, concluding that
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We are working with Compustat's Execucomp database for the Standard & Poor's
("S&P") 1500 companies between 1992 and 1998 and the Thomson Financial Securities (formerly SDC) M&A database.
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From 1992 until 1995, the annual probability that any single S&P 1500 firm was acquired

in a takeover rose almost linearly from 0.9 percent to 4.2 percent, while the mean value of total
CEO options, estimated by the Black-Scholes model, increased from $3.4 million to $5.6 million.
4
The mean value of CEO options increased from $5.6 million in 1995 to $15.1 million in
1998-a nearly threefold increase. By contrast, the annual probability that an S&P 1500 firm
would be acquired increased only marginally from 4.2 percent to 4.5 percent.
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option values influenced acquisition probabilities within any given
year is simply not possible at this early stage of our investigation.
Finally, I agree with Kahan and Rock that Delaware corporate
law has long embraced a norm of "bilateral," board-and-shareholder
participation in making basic corporate decisions-and that the
Delaware courts should be urged to adhere to this norm. I differ from
Kahan and Rock in this area principally on secondary matters:
whether the prevailing bilateral model is optimal for shareholders, and
whether the Delaware courts actually follow the bilateral model in the
takeover case law.
Despite these areas of agreement, however, I would like to flag
three areas in which I have reservations or disagreements with the
Kahan and Rock Article. I address each of these below.
I. OPTION COMPENSATION IN THE 1990s WAS NOT AN "ADAPTIVE
DEVICE" SPECIFICALLY TARGETED AT DELAWARE TAKEOVER LAW

Kahan and Rock describe the takeover market as a kind of game
between shareholders and managers. Managers move first by adopting
takeover defenses; shareholders, who are too weak to do otherwise,
respond with large carrots (stock options) and small sticks (independent directors). But this metaphor of a game seems misleading in two
respects.
As a descriptive matter, neither growth of option compensation
nor the influence of independent directors seems like anyone's calculated move in a simple game. Instead, both were long-term trends or
movements, with many proponents and detractors-but with no single
collective subject. The movement to add independent directors dates
back to the 1960s, well before recent interest in compensation; the
sharp rise in option compensation began in the 1990s. In both cases,
momentum built slowly. Boards copied boards, and boards increased
salaries, one at a time. Board positions in the United States shifted to
independent directors over a period of decades, just as they now are
shifting in foreign jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom.
Still more important, insofar as increased option compensation or
board independence did respond to shareholder concerns, shareholders are unlikely to have targeted these changes at legal impediments
to hostile takeovers. Takeovers affect only a small fraction of public
companies annually, and there are devices, such as golden parachutes,
that are much more precisely tailored to management's acquisition incentives than are options.
Rather, to the extent that institutional shareholders encouraged
boards to adopt changes in pay and governance during the 1990s, their
most likely goal was to increase global management performance, irrespective of whether a given company was the potential acquisition
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target. If Delaware takeover law played a role in fueling option compensation, it probably was indirect. Institutional shareholders might
have perceived the steep decline in hostile takeovers at the outset of
the 1990s as weakening management's performance incentives in general. Thus, they might have reacted to the loss of this global takeover
"stick," by offering the new and costly carrot of enhanced performance compensation to more or less all corporate managers.
Put differently, high-powered option compensation no doubt was
meant to induce managers to maximize shareholder value in general,
but I doubt it ever was intended to offset managerial resistance to
takeovers in particular. To the extent that options had the effect of encouraging friendly deals, I suspect the effect was an unintended and
incidental consequence of a much more diffuse effort to encourage
management performance. The contractual provision in most option
plans that permits options to vest upon a change of control is not evidence to the contrary. If this provision were designed to induce takeovers rather than to protect option values, it would be restricted to a
company's top managers. Instead, it typically extends its protection to
all participants in option plans, from the CEO to the worker on the
shop floor.
II. OPTION-DRIVEN FRIENDLY DEALS ARE NOT NECESSARILY
SUBSTITUTES FOR HOSTILE AND FRIENDLY DEALS OFTHE 1980s

My second reservation about the Kahan and Rock Article concerns what I take to be their implicit assumption that all deals have
roughly similar effects on shareholder welfare. In fact, there is reason
to believe that option-driven friendly deals may not be very good substitutes for hostile takeovers.
In the first instance, friendly deals are not disciplinary takeovers,
as I already have noted. Arguably, the hostile takeovers of the 1980s
motivated managers in general to maximize shareholder value. If so,
this effect was lost in the 1990s, as target managers came increasingly
to control whether or not their companies would be acquired. Perhaps
option compensation in the 1990s substitutes for the lost incentive of
the disciplinary takeover. If so, however, the cost of allowing target
managers to defeat hostile takeovers is not merely the cost of "bribing" a small percentage of CEOs each year to accede to friendly takeovers, as Kahan and Rock sometimes seem to imply. Rather, the cost
of legal change that allows target managers to block hostile takeovers
is the sum of all inducements paid to all managers to compensate for
the lost incentive effects of hostile takeovers. This sum is much larger
than the cost of persuading a relatively small number of managers
each year to go peaceably to the auction block.
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In addition, there are many more obscure consequences of shifting control over deals from bidders to target managers. Thus, it is by
no means clear what the incentive effects of large option payouts for
target managers really are. Are target managers with generous option
plans motivated to seek an acquisition partner as soon as possible in
order to cash out while they can? Might skilled managers reduce
shareholder value by selling out too soon rather than seeking to entrench themselves? Or are target managers motivated to bide their
time, perhaps until retirement, in the expectation that they always will
have still more options to cash out at a later date? And how does the
possibility of cashing out a treasure trove of stock options in a future
acquisition affect a target manager's incentives to maximize shareholder value today? If exercise prices on options are set to market
price when options are issued, might a target manager prefer low
share prices while he accumulates options in the expectation of realizing a larger gain when the company is sold? I do not know how important such perverse incentives are; I mention them only to emphasize
that option-induced deals are not substitutes for the hostile or friendly
deals of the 1980s. Whether they are better or worse for shareholders
remains an open question.
III. "ADAPTIVE DEVICES" IN THE TAKEOVER MARKET HAVE No
CLEAR IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL POLICY

The Kahan and Rock model of adaptive devices has no clear
implication for legal policy, other than the suggestion in the title of
their Article that we should "stop worrying" because the law is less
important than we might previously have believed. All of the old disputes about takeover policy still remain, it's just that they matter less
if Kahan and Rock are right. Curiously, however, the authors do not
conclude on this plausible, if oddly discomforting, point. Rather, they
press on to join issue in the traditional takeover debate by arguing
that the Delaware Supreme Court has gotten takeover law more or
less right. In particular, Kahan and Rock argue that the Court has
adopted a norm of bilateral decisionmaking, in which both the board
and shareholders must participate in fundamental corporate decisions
such as a sale of the company. Moreover, they claim that the norm of
bilateral decisionmaking is more likely to increase shareholder welfare than the competing norms of unilateral decisionmaking, whether
by the shareholders or by the board of directors.
Both of these claims about legal policy are, in my view, separable
from the main part of the Kahan and Rock Article-and perhaps for
this reason not very vigorously defended. The question whether
shareholders are the best judges of their own welfare lies at the heart
of the traditional takeover debate. If they are, a good case can be
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made that unilateral shareholder decisionmaking on acquisition questions is much more likely to increase shareholder welfare than a bilateral rule that permits boards to veto shareholder choice. Kahan and
Rock recite the familiar arguments about board expertise and shareholder collective action problems to reach an opposite conclusion, but
they do not explore how these problems might be resolved within the
framework of shareholder choice.
Equally noteworthy, Kahan and Rock's claim that Delaware's
takeover jurisprudence has adopted a bilateral decisionmaking norm
is itself contestable. To cite an example, a board of a public company
can protect a stock-for-stock merger against a competing offer with a
poison pill and subsequently leave the combined firm without ever
facing a shareholder vote. Similarly, a target firm with a staggered
board and a poison pill can in theory fend off hostile bidders indefinitely, providing that no hostile bidder can afford to pursue its offer
through two annual proxy contests. Both of these examples would
seem to violate the bilateral decisionmaking norm. The best explanation of the twists and turns in Delaware's takeover law is not bilateralism in my view, but board paternalism-a consistent policy of supporting the board's judgment over shareholder choice whenever there is
any ambiguity about where the best interests of shareholders lie. I develop this point in a separate article and will not expand upon it here.5
I mention it only because in that article I embrace bilateral decisionmaking, as previously described by Kahan, 6 as a feasible basis for reforming Delaware takeover law rather than as an accurate description
of its existing thrust.
My responses to the legal policy conclusions of the Kahan and
Rock Article are incidental to its main argument, however. I predict
this important Article will come to define the middle ground in the
takeover debates of the next decade. Its fundamental observations
about the effects of law on market participants who are able to react
are unquestionably correct.

5 See Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain
Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw U L Rev 521, 522-25 (2002) (contending that Delaware courts
operate under the assumption that only the directors, and not the shareholders, know the firm's
true economic value).
6 See Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox:The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover Jurisprudence,19 J Corp L 583, 600 (1994) (arguing that Delaware courts have tried to improve the
process of the target board's decisionmaking so as to reduce potential conflicts of interest while
also preserving shareholders' ultimate power to override a board's rejection of an offer).
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